

Contents

State and Mafia, Differences and Similarities (<i>Vincenzo Alfano</i>).....	3
Theory of the Whole and the part – Ontological Perspective (E. Husserl, R. Ingarden) (<i>Katarzyna Barska</i>).....	12
Research Approaches in the Study of Religion (<i>Konrad Szocik</i>).....	26
Interview: The Necessity of the Dialogue Between Judaism and Christianity (<i>James Daniel J. Lasker, Tudor Petcu</i>).....	36
Interview: The Importance of the Philosophy in our Days (<i>Michael Inwood, Tudor Petcu</i>).....	39

State and Mafia, Differences and Similarities

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Abstract:

The purpose of this article is to investigate about the differences and, if any, the similarities among the modern State and the mafia criminal organizations. In particular, starting from their definitions, I will try to find the differences between State and mafia, to then focus on the operational aspects of the functioning of these two organizations, with specific reference to the effect/impact that both these human constructs have on citizens' existences, and especially on citizen's economic lives. All this in order to understand whether it is possible to identify an objective difference – beside morals – between taxation by the modern State and extortion by criminal organizations. With this of course I do not want to argue that the mafia is in any way justifiable or absolvable, nor that it is better than the State. However, I want to investigate whether there is a real, logical reason why the State should be considered by the citizens more desirable than the criminal organizations oppressing Southern Italy, from a strictly logical point of view and not from the point of view of ethics and morality.

Keywords: state, mafia.

1. State ≠ mafia?

I intend to begin this study with an analysis of some definitions of State, and a verification of the applicability of the same definitions to mafia-type criminal organizations. The first one I consider is the definition of Norberto Bobbio, according to whom:

The definition of the State that continually recurs is that the State is the holder of the monopoly of legitimate force, such as it is necessary because the majority of citizens is not virtuous but vicious. That's because the State needs strength and this is my conception of politics. [...] The reason why there are States, including republics, is to curb vicious citizens, who are the vast majority [1, p. 8].

This definition incorporates and expands a well known idea by Max Weber, according to whom the State is “a community of people in which the administrative apparatus successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”

Why can the *Camorra*, the *Ndrangheta*, the *Sacra Corona Unita* or *Cosa Nostra*, the Southern Italy's powerful mafia organizations (referred from now on as ‘mafia’ without distinctions), not be considered States for the purposes of the above definitions? Essentially for the

following three reasons: because these criminal organizations do not have a monopoly on force, because the force they use is not legitimate, and because the goals they pursue are not virtuous.

Let us begin right from this point: it is my own opinion, but I hope (and it seems) that's an opinion wide spread into the academy and literature¹, that nothing is, by its own nature, virtuous; indeed, vice and virtue are tightly linked to the historical and cultural context in which they are considered. One could easily bring up, for example (making use of a motivation unfortunately quite common in Southern Italy), how it is considered virtuous by the mafia and their affiliates and supporters to force citizens to pay a fee for the maintenance of prisoners' families or widows of criminals. These in fact consider a virtuous act to contribute to the maintenance of women and children who, as a consequence of losing their husbands and fathers, struggle to make a living. Or again, it could be considered virtuous to extort money out of a company that has won a construction contract, to recover the funds that allow a criminal organization to maintain itself, and therefore its control and protection on the territory. I imagine that, just like me, some of the readers will not consider these examples virtuous: those I ask to understand that, in the same way and with exactly the same logic, many people – including me – would argue that there is just as little virtue in using force to enforce some of the objectives pursued by some modern States, such as conscription, monopoly on gambling, alcohol and tobacco, and of course wars. Also, I do not think there might be any doubts on defining Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia as States, and on how far from virtue they have strayed with their atrocities and purposes; at least from a historical perspective, therefore, even the biggest State-supporter must admit that State has not always been synonymous of virtue.

As for the monopoly of force, it can be easily shown that a criminal organization will never have a monopoly, as it will operate in a nation-State. But the argument can be reversed: nor the State could achieve monopoly, because of the existence of an organization criminal inside. It is therefore necessary to speak not of monopoly of force as an abstract ideal, but of monopoly of legitimate force. But who or what determines the legitimacy of the use of force? Different States have different limits on the use of force, and different centuries have seen very different ideas about which it is the border to legitimate the use of force. This fact suggests that there is no objective boundary between legitimate and illegitimate.

But even so, someone could still argue that while the number of cases in which the use of force by the State is permissible is published and ascertainable, the use of force by criminal organizations is more arbitrary. However, it is easy to see how, over time, the circumstances in which the State is permitted to use force change, in order to adapt to the goals pursued: once again, just think of the concept of lawful use of force three hundred years ago or today; therefore, this publication is not carved in stone and changes regularly. What makes it legitimate? In addition, as a further counter-argument, I doubt that anyone would consider legitimate the use of force on my part if I simply public announce (and publish!) that I will use violence against anyone will walk dressed in red in my surroundings! On the other hand, some criminal organizations have traditions alive and well articulated that guide their actions. This is a kind of “living constitution” that makes more or less predictable the use of force by them. Does this in the same way and for the same reasons we used to legitimate the States' use of the force makes it less odious or legitimate? I don't think so.

In conclusion, it seems that rest no option but that it's the State itself, tautologically, to consider its own use of force as legitimate: the word ‘legitimate’ has the same root of *legis*, and in its original sense means ‘permitted by law’: as stated, the law written by the State itself. Therefore, the State absolves itself, judging its own use of force as the only legitimate! And I have no doubt that for any organization to use the force by its own is just as legitimate! And that, given the

opportunity, it would consider its use of the force the only legitimate, and self-define itself as a State.

For other scholars of political science, the State is defined as *the original*, because its power comes only from itself and not by any higher entity. With this definition it is argued that the State is not subject to third parts, and is, therefore, independent and sovereign in a defined scope: it is organized as hierarchically structures for the best exercise of power. Again, it is easy to see a tautology in this definition. The State is not subject to other parts simply because it imposes subordination to all other entities that exist and insist on the territory in which it exercises its influence, and declares illegal all those who did not subordinate themselves. Also any mafia organization might claim, on the portion of land it occupies, its independence and sovereignty: certainly it does not pay taxes to an entity it recognizes as superordinate, and indeed demands that other entities, such as citizens or commercial activities of various kinds, operating on 'its' territory, should recognize their sovereignty and super-ordination. And it certainly does not believe that its powers are derived from the higher-level entity!

Another definition of State is tempted by Charles Tilly, which defines the State as [19]:

An organization that controls the population occupying a given territory is a State in so far as:

- it differs from other organizations that operate on the same territory;
- is autonomous;
- is centralized;
- each of its component parts is formally coordinated with each other.

Again, it can be seen to fall within the definition provided mafia criminal organizations. In fact, there is no doubt that these differ from other organizations working in the area: no one has difficulty distinguishing between the mafia and a cultural association, or a football club. The mafia organizations are autonomous, since, as we have already seen, certainly not derive their own power by the State; and they are equally certainly centralized, although various criminal organizations have varying degrees of territorial autonomy, as well as different States have different forms and levels of federalism; and still are composed of parts coordinated with one another, that's the reason why it's called "organized" crime. So even by the Tilly's definition, it is not possible to distinguish between the State and the mafia. Among other things, the American political scientist has also defined the State not only as an organization that provides security from external and internal threats in exchange for tax revenues (as the well known contract perspective), but also as an organization that represents a fundamental threat to the safety of its citizens should protect. Ultimately, the State provides protection for Tilly mainly by himself [17]! It is not difficult to see in this a parallel with the criminal organizations of southern Italy.

But is it really possible to distinguish between the State and mafia? We are looking for the answer by analysing the definition of State of another great thinker, Thomas Hobbes :

The State represents the instance unitary and sovereign neutralization of social and religious conflicts through the exercise of *summa potestas*, expressed through the abstract form and universality of the law which is legitimate under the mandate of authorization of individuals, in which there is the mechanism of political representation; citizens are in fact in the pre-policy which is defined as the state of

nature and the sovereign plays a 'representative' uniting in itself the 'dispersed multitude' [8].

At the first glance, it may seem very difficult to fall back to any form of organized crime in this definition. But I invite you to analyse the definition more carefully: for Hobbes the characteristic elements of the State seem to be primarily a function of unitarian, sovereign neutralization of social and religious conflict. Well, this is the function that, much of the State, in many parts of the country the mafia takes, for the mafia it is important to be recognized not only by the citizens as a guarantor of peace and stability, but also as a unique, effective authority to turn to for smooth social conflicts. The role of the mafia as pacifying religious conflicts is not, in fact, predominantly, in particular if we consider pacification between different religions (but on the other hand, this case is inapplicable to several States, especially those theocratic but not only). However, if we consider how religious conflicts interfere with religious beliefs of an organization to ensure that they are consistent with the social ones (e.g. the lawmaking function in the field of civil and religious marriage, or of religious and civil holidays, etc.), well in this case the role of the mafia in some areas of Italy is perfectly comparable to that of the State. Just think of the threats made by mobsters to push men to marry those women they had gotten pregnant, as to 'not dishonour them', or more generally to the sacredness recognized the role of the church, and how the mafia seeks supports and take prestige from this.

Another characteristic Hobbes consider is the *summa potestas*. It is unfortunately true that in some areas this influence is exercised by the mafia, and not by the State. But, for Hobbes, the *summa potestas* shall be expressed in the form of abstract and universal law. This is certainly not the form in which the mafia expresses its *summa potestas*. However, once again, we are facing the dilemma I expressed previously: is it just a matter of publishing and publicizing the rules? Because if the mafia acts according to patterns and principles, known or knowable in some way, why these should have less 'force of law' to those expressed by a State? And even these principles have an abstract and universal form! The laws are not but the codifications of habits and ancient customs. When the mafia demands that all commercial activities contribute to its 'cause' by giving a 'donation', what's this if not the applying of an abstract and universal principle? How is it different from taxation? Another controversial issue could be the following: the legitimation under the mandate of authorization of individuals, in which there is political representation, which for Hobbes is the unification of a multitude of instances missing. Surely the mafia is not entitled by a popular vote. However, it is authorized and considered authoritative by many citizens who live in certain areas of the Italian peninsula. In addition, if we consider the political representation as a unification of several instances in society as a criterion for the definition of a State, we could not consider a State a large part of African dictatorships, most of the States in the Middle East, and perhaps (stressing the concept) even any State that uses a majority law to elect Parliament, as this is undoubtedly detrimental to the representation of part of the scattered instances. So we have to consider in a more abstract way this Hobbesianly step. If we define the State as an organization empowered by the will of a vast majority of the population that inhabits it, and bringing together the various demands of society, well, in that case we can re-enter in the definition the criminal organizations in Southern Italy. Too many gangs, in fact, in their territories are entitled to a vast popular support, certainly higher than what the legitimate State enjoys in those places, and these are formed by parties who are carriers of several instances dispersed in society (the so-called godparents, after all, could be considered local leaders, and holders of the needs of the district that 'govern', against the 'central government' mafia).

For Carl Schmitt [11], [12], [13], the State is the decisive political entity, because to it belongs the *ius belli*: it alone can determine the enemy, can promote war and require its members the ultimate sacrifice. Once again, however, we must admit that we face a tautological definition. The *ius belli*, in fact, is self attributed by the State. Furthermore, in light of recent developments in terrorism, the question is whether Schmitt would not return on its definition of State: is Al Qaeda a State? And what about other terrorist organizations? The season of bombs that there was in Italy between 1992 and 1993, was it a war? All questions to which it is difficult to respond in a negative way by using the definition of the State of Schmitt as a basis. For the German thinker, the primary function of State is not expressed in waging war or in controlling the private lives of citizens, but in establishing order and security. Once again, we face also one of the functions of organized crime: to establish order and security within the territory. So is still not easy, not even taking up the definition of the German, distinguish between the State and the mafia.

For Douglass North, “a State is an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax residents” [10].

This definition is very interesting, since it defines the State, or rather its borders, in the light of the ability of taxing. With this in mind, at a first glance the mafia could not be considered a State. However, when analysing the definition more carefully, the mafia has undoubtedly, in certain areas of Italy, a comparative advantage in violence, and mainly finances its activities in three ways: asking for money to citizens living in a given territory, claimed as their own (the so-called ‘pizzo’); taking resources from other citizens through theft and robbery; trading and managing other economic activities, legal and illegal. With reference to the first source of supply of money from the mafia, how can it be said that in certain areas of Italy, the residents are not ‘taxed’ by the mafia? Again, the only difference between the ‘pizzo’ and taxes, can be found in the legitimacy of the act. But, as we have shown, it is a tautology, since is the State considers itself as legitimate, by its own laws, its own violence and its taxation, and no other. Still on the subject of legitimacy, it could be said that the State is legitimate because it is considered as such by the majority of citizens who insist on a given territory. However, even taking this path, the argument does not resist very soon, in fact we should consider that in certain areas of Italy, the mafia is considered more legitimate and more desirable than the Italian State by resident citizens, and that in other parts of Italy (i.e. in Veneto, where the secessionist demands are becoming stronger, but also in the Aosta Valley or in the provinces of Trento and Bolzano) where the mafia is not so strong, the legitimacy of the Italian State is widely questioned. What is it that makes it legitimate, beyond the tautological issue already addressed in the law?

Still, for some the State is recognized as such by the international community of States. Although interesting, and oozing Realpolitik from every pore, once again we are facing a tautological definition and not very useful ontologically. It also raises several new problems: how were born the first States? From those are they been recognized, if they are ‘equal’ members of a community? In which case there is not such a thing as a State? When is it not recognized by another²? Or if it is not recognized by the majority of the other States³? Or is there a different ratio, such as being not recognized by any of the members of the international community⁴? And then, of whom is truly established the international community? Only by members of the UN? So, this way to define the State probably raises more problems than it solves.

In the light of what we saw, therefore, it must be said that a definition of the State that is able at the same time to exclude the mafia, and to include the vast majority of the members of the international community of States, cannot be found.

2. Tribute ≠ pizzo?

Once ascertained the impossibility of distinguishing, by means of a comprehensive definition and not by tautological reasoning, between the State and the mafia, I intend to continue this study by trying to define the tributes, to see whether, at least in this, is detectable an own specificity that distinguishes the compulsory levy from the State from the operating criminal organizations, such as the 'pizzo', the so-called 'protection money'. Indeed, if it's not possible to differentiate the State by the mafia, maybe it's the case to being able to differentiate the taxes that it requests from the 'pizzo' required by the mafia. For the purposes of this paragraph, by tribute I mean all taxes and levies imposed as a mandatory requirements (or monopolistically⁵) from one State to its own citizens. The tribute, whose etymology comes from the collection that, in ancient Rome, was carried out for tribes⁶, is defined by Treccani encyclopedia⁷ as:

generic name of any cash benefit payable by citizens to the State and other public bodies, namely general and special taxes, erarial and local surcharges, taxes and mandatory contributions. [...] The notion of tribute today include: taxes, fees, contributions and fiscal monopolies.

Let us leave aside taxes, which are defined as an amount paid by the citizen in exchange for a service offered by the State⁸, and that even for the Italian Constitutional Court⁹ as opposed to the taxes do not refer to Article 53 of Constitution, which reads "everyone shall contribute to public expenditure because of their ability to pay [...]."

At least for the Italian case, therefore, the taxes, the expression of the exercise of taxing powers of a sovereign entity *par excellence*, are due to contribute to public expenditure. Scholars distinguish three functions of the tribute: *acquisitive*, which is to finance the expenditure required to maintain the bureaucracy; *distribution*, that is to change the distribution of wealth between taxpayers; and *promotional material*, which consists in encouraging or discouraging certain conduct. The 'pizzo', however, is defined as a form of extortion practiced by the mafia which consists in requiring the payment of a part of the earnings or a fixed amount of income, by operators of commercial and business, in exchange for a supposed and ill-defined 'protection' of the activity. Aside from the subject that requires it, because as we have seen it is not easy to define the State excluding the mafia from the definition, we can see how the pizzo has the same characteristics of taxes.

The pizzo in fact has certainly acquisitive function: it finance the expenditure required to maintain the organization that organizes the withdrawal. It also has, at least namely, a distribution function (as indeed any type of withdrawal): in fact it changes the distribution of wealth between taxpayers (if this redistribution is desirable or not, is an entirely different matter: on the other hand, if there was a distribution objectively and universally desirable all States should do the same tax policy, seeing that these are the most diverse, or we do not consider taxes those imposed by state agencies States that apply to certain tax policies, or also those obtained with the pizzo are considered forms of redistribution. Someone could argue that the tax policy of a State is a deliberately distribution while the action of the pizzo has distribution only as a secondary effect and not pursued: however considering the population affiliated with the mafia, and close to these at various levels, certainly the action of pizzo involves a redistribution of income from groups of citizens farther from the mafia in favour of those most faithful to this, and it's a pursued effect); and

the pizzo is also promotional: not all activities are in fact 'taxed' by the mafia in the same way, the demand for pizzo is variable depending on the area and the types of activities; therefore these criminal organizations create places and activities where there is an incentive to invest and other where is not. In addition, the will of several Italian entrepreneurs of not to invest in the south of Rome, demonstrates alone the promotional character of the pizzo.

So what is the difference between State tributes and pizzo¹⁰? Just as it seems to be impossible to define the State without including the definition mafia criminal organizations, does not seem possible to find a feature not found in pizzo in tributes.

3. Devaluation

In addition to taxes, the only alternative for the State to raise money is by printing it. This inevitably leads to inflation. Milton Friedman put forward the famous statement: "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" [5].

Fortunately, the mafia does not have the ability to print money, but continuing in the parallel carried out so far we can say that the equivalent of inflation to mafia is theft and robbery. If in fact the pizzo is closely linked to productive activities, and therefore predictable and 'manageable' by the entrepreneur, but thefts and robberies are occasional and unpredictable. In exactly the same way of robbery, inflation devalue private saving, for a monetary policy imposed by the State. However, unlike the previous cases, in this case there is a difference with the thefts and robberies perpetrated by the mafia: in fact hardly a criminal activity of this kind will be able to be as damaging as inflation. There is no need to quote the exceptional cases of 1980 in Italy, with an inflation rate of 21.2%¹¹, or the hyperinflation of Zimbabwe¹². In 2011 inflation in Italy was 2.8% (see [7]). Considering that the average income in 2010 was of 19,250 euro¹³, inflation has taken away from every single citizen 539 Euros on average. Much more than any criminal organization may have stolen by dint of robberies!

4. Final thoughts

If it is not possible, without the use of personal (and therefore by definition controversial and questionable) ethical principles, to distinguish between the State and the mafia, what makes State taxes less odious and unwanted than the pizzo "protection"?

If, as we seen, there is no possible difference between State and mafia, the use of the force by both to force citizen to give them money, it's just a form of robbery, and nothing else. And the natural and wide spread revolt, disgust and repugnance of honest citizens for criminal organizations which steal money from them to pursue their own, obscure, goals, should be equally reserved to the State.

Why then do we insist to grant to an entity that has repeatedly been shown to not be able to fulfil the tasks which aims, even when these are considered desirable by the individual, and not to be efficient, to govern our lives?

As already mentioned in the introduction, I want to close this work by pointing out once again that I do not intend in any way with this study to accredit or justify the odious gangs that harass and haunt Italy and the world, but instead would like to propose a more serious reflection on the role and legitimacy that the State should have in our lives.

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Notes

1. For instance, a good example of this is Franz Boas' idea of *cultural relativism*, an axiomatic principle established in the first decades of the 20th century by his students. Boas articulated the ideas in 1887, writing “...civilization is not something absolute, but/is relative, and/our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes” [Franz Boas, Museums of Ethnology and their classification, *Science* 9:229, 1887].
2. That's the case of Armenia, a UN member who's not recognized by the Pakistan; of Cyprus, whom is not recognized by Turkey and Northern Cyprus; of Israel, not recognized by 32 different UN members; of North Korea, not recognized by South Korea and Japan; of South Korea, not recognized by North Korea; and even of China, that even as a permanent member of the Security Council, is not recognized by 22 UN members (which recognizes Taiwan).
3. Actually, Palestine is recognized by 138 UN members, and is part of the General Assembly as observer. Is it a State? And what's about Taiwan, that's recognized by 23 UN members, and that is a former permanent member of the Security Council?
4. That's the case of Somaliland.
5. I.E. the tobacco in Italy: being a State monopoly, and so being impossible to other players than the State to operate in that sector, in fact any italian smoker tax himself on a voluntary way.
6. <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/tributo/>
7. *Ibidem*.
8. As, for example, the italian TaRSU, *Tassa per lo smaltimento dei Rifiuti Solidi Urbani*, which stands for Urban

- Solid Waste Management Tax, paid (at least on a theoretical plan!) by the citizens to have a public garbage disposal.
9. Italian Constitutional Court, sentences number 30/1964, 23/1968, 91/1972.
 10. By the way, if there is no difference between pizzo and charges, and these are an expression of the exercise of taxing powers of a sovereign body, it adds another element that suggests difficulty distinguishing between State and mafia too, since these organizations criminals prove to be sovereign entities.
 11. Indice nazionale dei prezzi al consumo (NIC con tabacchi).
 12. In which it seems that the annual inflation rate is equal to 89.7 trillion of billions percentage points! See [7].
 13. Dichiarazioni dei redditi IRPEF 2011.

Theory of the Whole and the part – Ontological Perspective (E. Husserl, R. Ingarden)

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Abstract:

The purpose of the paper is demonstrate the thesis that Ingarden's ontological system allows a better understanding of the “part-whole” problem than previous theories. Especially, if we take into account the existential ontology of Ingarden, which refers to Husserl “part-whole” theory, we can see that development of terms made by Ingarden sheds new light on old problems. In this context, particularly important is to distinguish between two existential moments: contingency/inseparateness, because thanks to them we can talk about many different types of relationships and hence many types of objects.

Keywords: existential moments, part, whole, object, Husserl, Ingarden.

1. Introduction to the topic

To honestly discuss moments of existential separateness and inseparateness, it will be necessary to elaborate previous contexts of understanding for these terms. This task, however, appears to be very difficult for, at least, a few reasons¹. Terminological confusion around the terms: ‘inseparate’ [‘x’ is inseparate if *it can exist only together with certain other ‘y’ in the unity of a whole, alternatively ‘non-self-sufficient’*], ‘incontingent’, ‘heteronomous’, ‘inderivate’ and their oppositions is the first, and, at the same time, the greatest difficulty.

Therefore, my objective here will be to clarify these terms and the way they are understood according to the Ingarden’s idea and indicate misunderstandings, which may be encountered in the literature on this subject as a result of this confusion.

In many instances, it will allow to refute the arguments against locating moments of separateness and inseparateness in the existential area. At the same time, it will turn out that the existential moments are not merely relationships between objects and they may not be reduced to them, and above all, what is my greatest concern, it will be demonstrable that ignoring the distinction inseparate–incontingent, and thus choosing the option with poorer ontology leads to giving up the solutions that are essential from ontological point of view².

In short, my intention is to demonstrate that Ingarden’s existential classification is relatively the best tool for developing ontology as such. This is because it allows you to refer to multiple types of objects, which in turn is an exemplification of adequacy of the existential and formal ontology. This may not be achieved when using the term ‘contingency’ [the dependence of a separate entity on another entity in order to *remain in existence, alternatively ‘existential dependence’*] that would (without distinguishing) comprise those types of moments, regardless of whether these studies would ultimately be existential or formal studies.

This valuation is significant, especially when we take into account Ingarden's suggestion concerning the role of ontology in formulating metaphysical systems.

My intention is also to make foundations for the Ingarden's hypothesis that understanding the moment of existential inseparateness goes beyond both the formal and existential area. The proper understanding of this moment is rooted in the material categories. More precisely speaking, this is, of course, the existential moment with qualitative reference of object³. It will also be necessary to determine precisely understanding of the formal categories which existential moments undoubtedly involve, i.e.: an object, the whole–the part, taking into account all divisions they include (an object–something, an object as composition of matter, form and mode of being, an object as the subject of properties, the whole as a unity, the whole as a summative whole, as well as the autonomous and heteronomous object).

As shown in the above example, even having initially arranged accents, they are distributed differently, from the material, through the formal, ending with the existential ones. This is because considerations in the field of formal, existential and material ontology intersect.

It turns out for instance that two basic subtypes of inseparateness distinguished by Ingarden from among many of them, i.e. material and formal inseparateness are not of the same rank. Due to being distinguished in material terms, the inseparateness allows to overcome regarding separateness–inseparateness opposition as a formal and ontological opposition. It is commonly accepted that this was Husserl's position and perhaps it is not unreasonable that it is imputed to Ingarden as well, and thus this part of his existential considerations is being degraded.

Husserl begins analysing the separate and inseparate content, starting with the Stumpf's findings and then he refers them respectively to the specific and abstract content. Particular attention should be paid to how this reference is understood. Taking into account the perspective of Stumpf's analyses, i.e. considering the inseparate and separate content as the contents of consciousness, it must be added that the Husserlian term 'content' is not limited to the phenomenological content.

Similarly, in the initial analyses, the terms 'object' ('content'), and 'part' are understood very broadly. Therefore, foundations for the difference between the concrete and the abstract may not be found in – in words of Husserl – phenomenological facts, because they belong to the realm of acts which means that, in the first instance, the concrete is given directly (separate) in the presentation, while in the second instance, what is perceived is the abstract content as inseparate and requiring being attached to the presentation of the relevant concrete this content is founded on.

The separate–inseparate opposition being differentiated within this particular realm is not the case either:

We've come far enough to see that when considering the difference between distinctive and indistinctive content (or, if you prefer [to use a different name], between the content presentable and unpresentable for themselves, separate and inseparate – since these expressions seem to be obvious here) we move within the realm of inexact ['subjective' intuition, having peculiar essential properties as well], and that applying this difference we will never reach to [the general ontological difference] between abstract and concrete content, or, as we decided to call them above, separate and inseparate [content] [4, p. 326].

The criterion to distinguish the separate and inseparate content founded on different acts: presentation for itself and noticing for itself, is also challenged by Husserl. Expressions 'for itself' in both acts operate in identical manner, thus they blur the difference between them. If we agree that the expressions 'for itself' in presentation is to be equivalent in meaning to the term 'separate', then it operates in terms of logic. In this case, the act of presentation may be interchangeable with the act of thinking and in this sense it refers to objective states of affairs, and therefore ontological

laws rather than subjective perceptions. The difference between a separate and an inseparable object (content) is founded in the thing itself or in essence of that thing, rather than in the way it is perceived: ‘What we can not think about may not exist, what can not exist, we can not think about – this equivalence determines the difference between the very concept of thinking and presentation to oneself and thinking in the regular and subjective sense’ [4, p. 293].

This is a very clear evidence that analyses of what is separate and inseparable, have been moved into the ontological dimension.

All previous meanings of abstraction may not be a foundation to identify the abstract and concrete content with what is inseparable and separate. Both abstraction – as an act of distinction in the intuitive the abstract content presentation, also perceived intuitively – and abstraction, which itself is not an act, but a property of the phenomenal part of an act consisting in some kind of highlighting, stressing the abstract content, still not perceived intuitively, but being a carrier of a specific intention (in phenomenological reflection); and also abstracting as a peculiar act of extracting the abstract content from the background – may not be a foundation to distinguish what is separate from what is inseparable, although what is inseparable and what is separate can be given as part of the three elements mentioned above. It is not out of the question however that, in this sense, we can abstract separate “objects”.

Similarly, the inseparable content may be perceived intuitively, therefore they are ‘parts’ of objects. So it is not the case as *distinctio rationis* teaching states, i.e. that objects have only separate parts – pieces that can be detached from them and presented separately. On the other hand, the inseparable content identified with abstract ideas (Locke), as general meanings, are detached from specific intuitive acts. It is also not the case that – according to Husserl – highlighting and emphasising abstract content is equivalent to formation of abstract concepts.

Therefore, the act of noticing the abstract content is one thing, and the act of general presentation is quite another thing. In the latter, intention is directed to species; specific intuitive acts are foundations for the intention that is fulfilled, emphasising the abstract content, it is not them however, but species what is intended. These acts are not abstract content either.

As these critical studies imply, inseparable or abstract moments, which make up an object, are still confused with species, respective, subjectively experienced abstract content is confused with abstract concepts (meanings of certain names) while [emphases, resp.] acts of noticing this abstract content are confused with acts of general presentation [4, p. 266].

Transferring the difference between what is inseparable and what is separate within the realm of acts of presentation or phenomenological content, at the same time confusing the immanent object with the semantic content of a presentation, results in confusing the abstract content within an object, with species. Husserl points out that it is this position that leads to refusing to adopt the thesis on the intuitive nature of the abstract content. He refers to positions of Höfler and Meinong: ‘The intuitive nature of the abstract content is denied in the same way, although, as moments of concrete intuition, they are perceived intuitively as well; this is true, since what deceives us here is [sensual] unintuitiveness of general concepts’[4, p. 267].

Therefore, in the field of ontology, what exists are individual and general (specific) objects. Adopting this thesis allows to avoid earlier equivocation, in which general objects and general meanings (general presentations) are called concepts. This equivocation has led to next equivocation of name and object of presentation and its content (the meaning of the name). This kind of confusion is a result, as it seems, of different acts of individual and general presentation of object. Presentation of the latter is founded on the presentation of the concrete, whether conceived as a whole or as its parts (property) perceived as highlighted part of the act as well, which underlies the separate act (separate founded act).

No part or property of presentation of an individual, mentioned above, contains species. Therefore, presumption of the property of an object is not presumption of species. While attempting to grasp the content of an object, a new method of presentation is constructed under which species can be referred to. To put it simply, we can say that when species is the object of presentation, it is given via mediation of an individual object and its properties, so in this perspective, also relationships between species and an individual object are given. It is acceptable to recognise that what is inseparable – abstract in the ontological perspective of individual (concretes) and general (specific) objects – is equivalent to a part of an object, if it itself is not an object or a concrete. The latter condition is only in as much important as certain continuity may happen, even inseparable (in the presentation), but referred to the separate parts, because they would be concretes e.g. parts of equally coloured surface.

For Husserl, (in)separateness is grounded in the material beings, in the essence of the content. In terms of epistemology, it corresponds to synthetic laws a priori. Therefore, it is not an analytical necessity, because it is a consequence of analytical laws which contain only formal concepts and the corresponding theorems are formulated without peculiarity of content of objects. They may be totally formalised, because they are not sensitive to any material aspect. Matter can always be replaced with a pure form.

The process of abstraction may be understood as disregarding matter totally (formalisation) while ignoring recognising the existence of individuals and the all relationships of empirical nature, which is expressed by their mere being a priori. Empirical relationships are ignored in similar manner when considering synthetic laws a priori, this time however, abstraction is of ideating nature (generalisation) and to put it simply, it is quite the opposite, because necessity is derived from matter, and abstracts from form⁴.

At this point, another difficulty arises, which means that objectivity (universality and necessity) of laws derived based on relationships between material entities may be questioned. After all, it is acceptable to assume that necessities we mentioned before, are grounded in empirical relationships or sensory impressions, which means that they are always grasped as based on of sensory data.

The first option forces us to abandon a priori laws by returning to actuality, the second option forces us to return to subjectivity. This is not a sufficient premise to undermine the position presented, because the derivation of necessity of this particular ground is not sufficient to give rise to further reductionism.

I will not get more into detail with this issue, because solving it is not yet necessary to analyse the issues being taken, and the nature of the problem would require extensive research in epistemology, which in the final context – in the context of non-reductionist Ingarden's ontology we adopted here – are not necessary. But let me just quote, as it seems, a similar position to issues we outlined, taken by Piotr Łaciak in his article 'Kant and Husserl and the Problem of the Material a priori':

In view of considerations set out in this text, it becomes obvious that the dependency on sensory impressions does not have to be evidence of the empirical cognition, for in view of both Kant and Husserl, non-pure cognition a priori as non-pure is dependent on sensory impressions because it refers to the material content of things, and at the same time as a priori, it is independent from experience, because it meets the requirement of universality and necessity [7, p. 55] (see also [8]).

What is most important and worth emphasising can be generalised so that all sources of inseparateness refer to the material ontology. Necessity of coexistence of inseparable moments is implied by material relationships of essence, not from the formal categories. Husserl expresses it explicitly:

No one will regard laws such as the law of causality that describes inseparateness of changes [in the real objects] or (usually the way they are formulated is not satisfactory) laws that describe inseparateness of pure qualities, intensities, extensions, limits, forms, relationships, etc., as equal to [pure ‘analytical’] general laws, such as the whole can not exist without parts, or [analytical necessities such as] a king, a lord, a father can not exist without lieges, servants, children, etc. In general we can say here: correlates demand one another, they can not be conceived without one another, resp. they can not exist. If we compare this with any specific theorem from the opposite group, such as a colour can not exist without something that is coloured, or a colour can not exist without a certain extension it coats – the difference is blatantly obvious immediately. Colour is not a relational expression, whose meaning would contain in itself a reference to something else. Although colour ‘can not be conceived’ without a coloured object, after all existence of is a coloured object and more precisely: extension, is not ‘analytically’ grounded in the concept of colour [4, pt. I, p. 311–312].

2. Eugenia Ginsberg’s Criticism of Husserl’s Theory of the Whole and the Part

When classifying the moment of inseparateness as an existential moment, Ingarden distinguishes formal and material types of existential inseparateness, the first one however is subordinate to the other. This reference is important, especially when considering the Ginsberg’s counter arguments put forward to Husserl’s statements. The thesis on whether division into separate and inseparable parts corresponds to identical division in the area of objects is questioned. The term ‘object’ is understood extremely broadly, it is interchangeable with the term ‘something’. This is because it seems unlikely that all objects are parts of some kind of the whole.

Husserl’s position would be more understandable if Ingarden’s meaning was used already at this point of the analysis. If we assume that Husserl discusses both (in)separateness as well as contingencies, then, indeed, the Absolute would be the only independent object. Obviously, in Ingarden’s perspective, what is contingent, may be a part of some other thing (always separate), but does not have to. There is a discrepancy between Husserl and Ingarden at this point. Later in this discussion, we will find to what extent these differences are merely of terminological nature.

Returning to the objections raised by Ginsberg and, at the same time, maintaining Husserlian assumptions, i.e. the term ‘object’ being conceived in the most general meaning, while the word ‘part’ means only real parts, what is disputed in determining inseparateness are⁵:

- a) necessity of existence of an object complementary to this object and
- b) existence of a heteronomous object as part of the whole, which is created along with objects complementary to it.

Prior to examining in detail Ginsberg’s examples that question the Husserlian implications, which are inherent to describe inseparateness, let me point out that some kind of confusion becomes apparent even in what has already been quoted above. Hence the call for proper understanding of the terms ‘object’ and ‘part’. The first term is clear, as used by Twardowski and Meinong, it is the most general concept of object, interchangeable with the term ‘something’, therefore, in this interpretation, each part is an object. This in no way implies that all objects are parts of some other

things. So, how should we understand a real part? What is acceptable is the view that 'real' means here the same as 'assigned to an object (the whole) rather than actually existing'.

Arguments put forward by Ginsberg have to be presented:

Re 1. It is commonly believed that a relationship is a heteronomous object because of its segments. Nevertheless, for a relationship to exist, existence of its segments is not necessary. Since let us for example consider the following relationship of implication: 'If a tree is a metal, then a tree melts in fire.' States of affairs, marked as antecedent and consequent, are segments of this relationship. Implication relation, that occurs between these two segments, exists resp. occurs, although they themselves do not exist. Similarly, if the contradiction relation occurs between states of affairs, then, perforce, it is always heteronomous towards one existing and one non-existing segment – if the principle of excluded middle and the principle of contradiction are right. If the heteronomous objects do not require the existence of complementary objects, then they do not require existence, which is contemporary with them [3, p. 155].

This reasoning may be questioned in the first instance by an argument, which Ginsberg was aware of. It would be sufficient to assume existence in the broad sense which would make it impossible to acknowledge the existence of objects constituting segments of the relationship discussed. Ginsberg accepts that it is wrong to assign Husserl using this understanding of existence, and even if this would be the case, her criticism could be considered as transcendent towards the Husserl's position.

It is allowed, however, to put forward a more serious objection. It can be reduced to the fact that in the example presented by Ginsberg, a confusion occurred with what Husserl distinguishes and calls formal (analytical) necessities implied from analytical laws a priori, with what is synthetic a priori, thus being foundation for (in)separateness. The theorem that any relationship has segments is an analytical theorem and it may not be a basis for inseparateness.

In addition, serious doubts may be raised towards the term 'state of affairs' used, which has multiple philosophical associations (scholastic *aliqualiter*, *esse*, *modus se habendi*, *tantum complexe significabile* etc.⁶) and became a truly technical term, as a result of phenomenologists' work. This was pointed out by Ingarden when he wrote: 'By whom this term (in German *Sachverhalt*) was introduced into the German philosophical literature, I can not say. Anyway, since the research conducted by phenomenologists – Husserl, Reinach, Pfänder – it has gained the right to citizenship in the philosophical language' [6, p. 178].

This is the interesting because inseparateness is referred to by describing what the very state of affairs is in Ingarden's meaning. At the same time, according to this approach, what is marked by the antecedent is not the state of affairs. The sentence 'A tree is a metal' does not refer to a state of affairs, because analyses of a state of affairs refer to the formal schema: 'a subject of properties – properties' and it is in this relationship that we are dealing with inseparateness. Language expresses this by using the subject-predicate sentences like 'this rose here is red' – the state of affairs: the redness of this rose here. For Ingarden, this is the state of qualification of things, distinguished from the states and of appearance of things and the states and of happening of things; the latter would include a consequent. Whether implication (relation) is true or false is based on the true presupposition, which is the state of affairs, 'metal melts in fire'. What occurs here is truth, which means that the content of the state of affairs 'formal object of proposition' overlaps with the

‘material object of proposition’. This distinction means that there can be no relation and non-existent segments, since both segments and a relation always belong to the same order, regardless of whether they correspond to the objective states of affairs or not. Following Ingarden, it is recommended to say again: ‘Each categorical proposition has its own formal object, i.e. an intentional state of affairs presumed in the content of the proposition. If the proposition is true, then, in addition to a formal object, it also has a material object, i.e. an objective state of affairs’ [5]. What is also important is that there is no difference in material terms (material content) between a purely intentional state of affairs and an objective state of affairs. The difference between them is of existential nature, the former ones, in contrast to the latter ones, are heteronomous⁷.

In order not to be influenced by simplifications, including for example: denying the antecedent of the implication reference to the state of affairs in Ingarden’s meaning, ignoring the peculiarity of the conditional proposition and the absence of an explicit (closely related to inseparateness and separateness) isolation of state of affairs from relation, Ingarden’s position should be presented in detail on the issues put forward; I will do it following discussing Husserl’s position.

To be more specific about the second Ginsberg’s objection towards Husserl’s definition of heteronomy, you should keep in mind that in this case, the clarified term ‘heteronomy’ is equivalent to the Ingarden’s term ‘inseparateness’, having ignored the auxiliary terms (‘the whole’ and ‘parts’), which, as presented here, should be considered as causing difficulties. Let us quote Ginsberg:

Re 2. It is also wrong to claim that a heteronomous object can exist as part of the whole, which – according to Husserl – would be made up along with the object complementary to it. Hence, for example, a property of A being different from B is heteronomous towards both B as well as A. Nevertheless, a property of being different object A has, does not B make up any whole with object B. Similarly, relations do not make a whole with its segments. They are heteronomous to them, they can only exist as parts of the whole. Thus, for example, a colour to exist requires an inheritive object, of which it could be a part of. However, object’s heteronomy, which requires a whole, is just a single type of objects’ heteronomy [3, pp. 155–156].

The last sentence of the excerpt quoted expresses the need, which will be satisfied by Ingarden, by distinguishing inseparateness and contingency. Let us however come back to Husserl. This time as well Ginsberg is aware that her criticism is of external nature, because ‘being different’ belongs to relative properties, whereas Husserl reduces his consideration to absolute properties and does not go beyond the being which is analysed. This example can be refuted in a similar manner as the previous one. Difference of some A and B is not content-grounded but if you say the sentence, ‘This redness is different from this greenness’, it will be empirical (‘this’) refinement of synthetic necessity, whereas inseparateness is located within the colourfulness (a multitude of possible concretisations of colours) and the concrete (the uniqueness of the implementation of a specific colour⁸).

This example reveals relativity of (in)separateness: something is (in)separate always in relation to something else. Husserl’s definition is as follows:

Inseparate in the whole G and towards it, or towards the set of all contents determined by G, is called each of its partial content, which can exist only as part, and only as a part of the whole such species, which is represented in this set. Each

partial content of which it can not be said, is separate in the whole G and towards it. In short, we also speak about the inseparate and separate parts of a whole, in the corresponding meaning about inseparate and separate parts of parts (partial wholes) of the whole [4 pt. I, p. 320].

This definition gives rise for at least three important theses.

What we describe as inseparate, may be referred, according to Husserl, to both the whole and to other parts of the whole⁹. Within a single whole, two types of parts were distinguished: separate and inseparate. Reference of the inseparate content to the whole is ambiguous. On the one hand, other contents – parts are in consideration, on the other – the whole is in consideration, which is a summative whole of these contents, and can be of transcendent nature, because it is grounded in the species (type), and due to being the summative whole, it is merely its representation.

This is the right moment to clarify the issues discussed with use of Ingarden's categories. At the point, an obstacle is emerging that was not overcome by Ginsberg. Since she divides the whole into autonomous (separate) and heteronomous (inseparate) parts [Ingarden uses terminology: inseparate–separate, as equivalent], Ginsberg has difficulties in option two (inseparate parts) when she determines certain regularities (parts–wholes). In fact, more precisely speaking, in the first type of this option (inseparate part of and the whole). Types of option one (separate part–separate part, separate part–the whole) overlap with instances occurring within the separate wholes).

Part of the inseparate whole may be inseparate towards: a) the whole it is a part of, b) another part of this whole, c) something (an object) located outside this whole. Regarding the second type, Husserlian Theorem II is important, which is as follows: 'The whole, which contains its part as an inseparate moment, but does not contain the supplement it requires, is inseparate as well, i.e. it is inseparate towards each superior separate whole, which contains this inseparate moment' [4, pt. I, p. 326].

However, using the term 'the whole' twice, in two different meanings, is misleading. The first, inseparate whole is, actually, not a whole. It is desirable to use the term 'unity', while the supplement of, basically, not the part (although, following Twardowski here, a part is extremely broadly understood, 'as a metaphysical part'¹⁰ as well), but of a moment, is based on founding, and indeed related to the concept of inseparateness as opposed to existential contingency, which occurs between parts in the proper sense, it should be added: between separate parts. This prevents the Ginsberg's error, which is, in turn, highlighted by P. Simons [10], when he says:

Suppose we consider a whole *a* compounded of the colour and shape (understood as individual accidents, not as universal properties) of a particular brick in wall. This is dependent upon the extension of the brick, and thereby also on the brick itself, but it is not dependent upon the *wall*, as – according to *Theorem II* – it should be, *a* requires the existence of the brick, but not the superordinate wall, since *a* can perfectly well exist whether the wall does or not, can predate and survive the wall, and would usually do so, as long as the brick did not change in shape or colour.

The criticism and counterexample fail because Ginsberg fails to observe the distinction which Husserl makes between *foundation* and *relative dependence*: an individual *a* of the species *a* is *founded* on an individual *b* of the species *b* if *a* has to be supplemented by *bs* in order to exist at all, and *b* here does the job for *a*; an individual is *dependent relative* to another individual if it is founded on something 'within the range of the latter, i.e. is founded on some proper or improper part of it.

Thus every case of founding is a case of relative dependence, but not *vice versa*. The brick example is just such a case: the colour & shape *a* is founded on the extension of the brick, and the brick is a piece of the wall, so *a* is dependent relative to the wall, but *a* is not founded upon the wall. The mistake is quite understandable however, since Husserl is not always consistent in his terms, and introduces them in what, by modern standards, is a sloppy and haphazard fashion.

It can be assumed that Simons, indeed, correctly differentiates *relationship of founding and the relative contingency*, however the assumption that the latter is contained in the former seems to be less accurate, i.e. all that is founded, it is also relatively contingent, but not vice versa. The situation is different if the Ingarden's order is introduced. Here, what is founded, is existentially inseparable, and what is relatively contingent, is existentially contingent, but everything that is existentially contingent may not also be existentially inseparable, and vice versa. Simons's interpretation involves a presumption that what is linked with the relation of founding, are objects (concretes)¹¹. The founding relationship in Husserl's view is rather in species, and it is impossible to think that species are actual parts of objects nor that in this relationship they themselves are parts that make up a whole as the sum of parts. Here is how the situation is described by M. Rosiak:

However, we must not forget what at the same time Husserl says about the nature of elements linked with founding bonds: these are species and types, rather than individuals. It is from this point of view that you should look at an example of connection of two elements, of which one is founded in the other. Elements *a* can be regarded here as a type, while *ab* connections can be regarded as species that falls under this kind. However, this type itself is indeterminate in terms of actual co-existence (or connection) with the moment *b*. An object that falls under type *a* can exist both as a representative of the species *ab*, and without the determinant *b*. This can be illustrated by using the Aristotelian hierarchy: the type of animal breaks down into two species – rational animal and irrational animal. If we agree that the moment of rationality is founded in animality, then this is not equivalent yet with the claim that these two species are a whole. It is quite obvious that a pair of elements connected with founding relationship does not generate a whole, but two completely different wholes. What kind of the whole will be created depends on whether the moment *b* is indeed connected with foundation *a*, or whether the latter exists without it [9, pp. 42–43].

This complicated situation is a result of Husserl using terms 'part' and 'whole' in at least two different meanings, and, as highlighted by Simons, is a consequence of assigning the founding relationship to species and individual exemplifications at one go.

These problems become apparent even at the first Husserlian attempt to describe inseparateness:

It can be put more simply by saying: inseparable objects are objects of such [pure] species for which the law [derived from essence] occurs, that if they exist at all, they exist only as parts of larger wholes of a certain [assigned] species. That is the point in the concise expression which says that they are parts that exist only as parts, and they

can not be conceived as something that exists for itself. The colour of this paper here is its inseparable moment, it is a part of, not only factually, but [according to its essence,] according to its [pure] species is predestined to be a part, because the colour in general [and purely as such] can only exist as a moment in something coloured [4, pt. I, pp. 295–296].

The transition from species to their exemplification is clearly noticeable. Inseparateness can only be described in this double perspective. Its concept comprises ‘necessity’, thus being founded on relationships of essence rather than actual relationships, but this is not equivalent to the fact that inseparateness does not occur in the realm of actuality. Both species are not parts of actually existing objects (since they have a totally different existential characteristics) and their exemplifications implemented as an object may not be described in this way. They are distinguished by calling them ‘metaphysical parts’, but ‘moment’ is a better description, which refers to unity rather than – as in the first case – to the whole that is composed of parts.

When creating a theory of the whole and parts, Husserl was not, however, fully aware of this distinction, although you may detect this intuition emanating in many passages of his considerations. It is more appropriate to admit that until Ingarden nobody accomplished this clearly and completely.

To do justice to things, a detailed analysis of Husserl’s position that takes into account the Simons’ interpretations is advisable.

3. Peter Simons’ Proposal

It is hard to reject the general and initial premise of Simons’ considerations which states that there are two most important concepts in the Logical Investigations, ‘the whole’ and ‘foundation’. At the same time, they are not defined by Husserl unambiguously¹². According to Simons, it is recommended to distinguish three types of the whole: narrow, broad and strict, while only the last of these types is the term used by Husserl himself. The wholes in the narrow sense are the wholes which are related with each other with a unifying moment. Many beings create a single whole due to some external thing. For Husserl, this type is not acceptable with respect to all wholes. If it were different way, Husserl would in this respect agree with Twardowski (see page 9). Husserl goes beyond such a concept of the whole, being aware of the danger of infinite regression of parts.

The whole in a broad sense is constituted by being an object. This means that the structure of an object as a whole appears as the most important factor here rather than relationships of its individual parts. In other words, regardless of how strict relationships between the parts are, if each of them can be referred to a specific, single object, they are its parts. You may dare making a statement that the structure of an object is the unifying moment, however, with the important difference that it (an object) is not something external towards its parts. When, however, accuracy of relationships between parts is irrelevant, a hypothesis is acceptable that in this meaning everything is an object (Husserl would have never agreed to this hypothesis because he makes clear contrasts between concept of ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’. Another subject of controversy is determining the criterion to distinguish objects with inner unity from those that are wholes in the weakest meaning and either no longer belong to objects (individuals), or still do not belong to them, if we consider a group of individuals as individual in the meaning of the summative whole.

Simons adopts a linguistic criterion, i.e. he holds that all that has proper names in singular is an individual (an object). When defining this type of the whole, Ingarden’s distinction should be

mentioned because what is also useful here is the difference between what is contingent and what is inseparable. The first segment of the division comprises all objects of the higher order as a whole, the second segment comprises an initially individual object. With regard to what is contingent, Ingarden elaborates entire system of possible types of relationships between parts of such wholes, which will be discussed elsewhere. On the other hand, the second Ingarden's option corresponds to what is here referred to as a strict whole, i.e. the whole whose parts are in themselves directly or indirectly founded and nothing that constitutes those parts is founded in anything except the whole. Nothing stands in the way, in this context, of the term 'funded' being regarded as interchangeable with the term 'inseparable', as Husserl himself does [4, pt. I, p. 326]. The inner unity of 'parts' (moments) in such a whole is inseparable. Unlike the summative whole, it is not founded on an external moment of unity, since in all wholes contradictory to this unity, parts of these wholes are separate. Husserl himself has perfectly expressed it when he wrote:

Anyway what strikes us is the fact that, where the occurrence of connecting forms may indeed be stated as [individual moments of intuition], connected parts are separate towards each other, e.g. sounds in the unity of a melody or isolated pieces of colouring in unity of colour configuration or partial figures in unity of some more complex figure, etc. Whereas our efforts are in vain, when in visual unity of the phenomenon, apart from contents constituting forms that unify pieces, we want to locate also those that combine with each other [inseparable moments] e.g. colour and extension or that combine hue and brightness within the colour, while [they combine the moment of form with the moment of size] within extension, etc. [4, p. 346].

Of course one might put forward objection that being influenced by this paragraph, what is described here is merely relationships limited to certain content, rather than objects, so this would be true only in relation to the realm of phenomenology, and the state of affairs described here could result from some deficiencies within the theory of cognition. Husserl anticipated this type of objection and adopted the relationship of founding as a fundamental relationship for all the wholes considered:

Obviously, this approach [applies not only to the realm of intuitive objects (in particular phenomenological content) which we used as an example, but to the realm] of objects in general. We are even inclined to say: what really unifies are the relationships of founding. As a result, unity of separate objects is created by founding as well. Since they are not founded one in another, because they are separate, what remains is the possibility that they themselves, even jointly, are foundation for the new contents, which, because of the situation with regard to the founding 'segments', are called unifying contents [4, p. 348].

We quoted quite extensive excerpts of Logical Investigations because they comprise in full Husserl's discussion of types of the whole, showing not only how they kind of intersect each other, but also how they differ. First of all, our intention is to highlight the difference in the relationship of parts of the wholes defined, i.e. inseparable and separate "parts". In the first case, words of Husserl are symptomatic of this whole, and more specifically: of this unity, which once again are worth quoting:

But those we refer to, have a lot in common, they are after all founded one in another and that is why they need no chains or ties [...], to gather them together. Actually, all these expressions do not have any sense in their case. Where isolating them makes no sense, there the problem of how to overcome this isolation makes no sense as well [4].

Moments in the relationship of inseparateness, which are called here inseparate parts, may not be isolated. They themselves form a unity by means of the relationship, intersecting each other, and this unity is something else than the unity of the summative whole, and alternatively of other wholes united by the moment of unity. In both these cases isolation of parts can be done and is carried out in the same way as respectively in collective and distributive sets. Intersection of moments of unity, which is the essence of inseparateness, excludes this type of operation of isolating these moments and constitutes peculiarity of this type of structure. This peculiarity is manifested in the unity of inseparate moments. This situation is vividly illustrated by Rosiak:

Whereas, when we take the coloured extension as an example and assume that the extension is the foundation of colourfulness (but not vice versa), no one will expect that it will be possible to divide this whole, so that a colourless extension appears as a correlate with the abstract colouring since it is not a part of the whole we consider. If it was the case, this colour would be a sort of crust put on it rather than the moment that intersects with it [9].

4. Final thoughts

At first, the fact that the Husserl and Ingarden derive definitions of these terms from the part and the whole in a different way, was the basic difference within the theory of inseparateness/separateness between Husserl and Ingarden.

Husserl defines both terms, referring parts to the whole. One time, the whole is made up of an object and its parts, which are perceived as separate or inseparate (moments of properties), another time he refers parts of the given whole to parts of another whole on the background of species and types [Theorem II].

Whereas Ingarden describes inseparateness as a ‘mutual’ relationship of “parts” (moments) within the whole (unity), while pointing out at the same time that either this is (inseparate) unity, i.e. once again referred to some kind of the whole or separate and it no longer is inseparate towards anything. At the level of species and types, Ingarden does not relate them to each other as (separate) wholes, because there is no need to do so, although these types of areas are elaborated based on corresponding distinctions.

The example given by Rosiak can be as well replaced by unilateral inseparateness of types towards species.

What is common for Husserl and Ingarden, however, is the belief that inseparatenesses are primarily derived from matter without taking account of form. When the primary types of inseparateness will be discussed (formal and material inseparateness), it will turn out that for Ingarden this is a more complicated issue.

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Notes

1. Ingarden's innovation, which consists in classifying these moments as existential moments, is also important. Some researchers question its legitimacy. This is however a separate issue that requires a more advanced reasoning.
2. What I mean here are also all these instances, typical of English-speaking commentators in the subject we discuss, who intend to qualify the ontological inseparateness within the ontological incontingency, but at the same time they make distinction between the Husserlian foundation and relative dependence (Peter M. Simons). This position is inconsistent with the Ingarden's suggestion. At the same time, when interpreting the Ingarden's ontological moments, the difficulty also occurs at the level of the language itself because following defining the four pairs of ontological moments, elaborated by Ingarden, including the ontological contingency, you come across the fifth one, comprising all of them and referred to as 'dependence'. Cf. A. L. Thomasson, *Ingarden and the Theory of Dependence*, translated by Artur Mordka, 'Sofia', no. 3/2003, UR.
3. Therefore, predicating on the very existential moments as existentially inseparable in relation to the mode of being as a whole, is unacceptable.
4. 'Abstraction in the meaning of the very act is something completely different from the mere paying attention to a moment of being red or highlighting it, to mark this difference we talked about the ideating or generalising abstraction in multiple instances. This very act is what the traditional way of talking about abstraction refers to, according to it, what we get with "abstraction" are not particular individual features, but the general concepts (direct presentations of attributes as unities in thinking). Sometimes this manner of speaking is extended to the conceptual presentations of the complex forms mentioned, the presentation of some A, a lot of A etc. All other properties are disregarded, the abstract presentation of A adopts new "forma", but no new "matters" [4, pt. I, p. 274].
5. E. Ginsberg uses terms 'inseparate/separate' in the meaning in which Ingarden uses 'heteronomous/autonomous' in his terminology.
6. See [2, p. 2]. Also [11].
7. This was pointed out well as by [1, p. 99].
8. '[Thus, the concept of inseparateness is equivalent to the concept of the ideal] being subordinate to the law in uniform relationships. If a part is a part of not just factual relationship but determined by the [ideal] law, then it is inseparate, because this relationship determined by the law does not mean anything but a the fact that a part that belongs to such species [in accordance with its pure essence] under the law it can only exist as combined with some other parts, which belong to these or those species assigned. Also, where the law regulations apply to the impossibility instead of necessity of a combination, for example, where it states that the existence of part A excludes the existence of part B as contradictory to it, we reach inseparateness in there as well. Since A may

exclude B only so that they both demand the same in a mutually exclusive way. One colour excludes a different colour – but on the same piece of surface that they both would completely cover, although they both can not do this’ [4, pt. I, p. 309–310]. The above excerpt also prompts to add a general comment, i.e.: this type of approach can not be interpreted extensionally and the Husserlian theory of the whole and the part should be accepted only along with the Platonic experience and associations. Also P.M. Simons, *Three Essays in Formal Ontology*, refers to this aspect [in:] *Parts and Moments Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, *Analytica*, München 1982, p. 116.

9. See Ginsberg’s remarks regarding the understanding of inseparateness by Twardowski.

10. To distinguish between two types of parts, also the term ‘elements’ is used (even by Twardowski). This issue is also discussed by Marek Rosiak in the article [9], when he wrote: ‘If, therefore, some elements of the whole do not make up parts of it, then does it make sense to talk about compliance with Theorems that Husserl states on this issue, and in particular with his view that all that can be distinguished in an object is a part? If parts in the strict sense were the only type of parts, then, of course, compliance does not make any sense. But in the second part of *Logical Investigations* Husserl speaks in favour of the fact that there are no other parts as the type just mentioned. These two theorems may not be held consistent at the same time. A generic term must also be taken into account as part of an object, or it must be concluded that not everything that is related to each other by founding relationships in an object is a part of it’ [9, p. 45].

11. In terminology used by Ingarden: object in the strict sense, which is the subject of properties. Properties are regarded here as objects.

12. The conjecture that the absence of formalisation of the theory of the whole and the part is Husserl’s deliberate act, should also be accepted. It is worth mentioning that such action was motivated, in particular, by the fact that the founding relationship and inseparateness relationship, which is of no small importance in this theory, are related with material laws and as such they are not subject to formalisation.

Research Approaches in the Study of Religion

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Abstract:

Despite development of secular ideas and concepts in the Western world, we can observe increasing interest in the study of religion. However, this popularity of the study of religion and different research approaches has caused that in some sense scholars that were studying religion came to a dead point. Here I show that the most optimal research approach in the study of religion is pluralistic, integral paradigm which connects old traditional methods with naturalistic, cognitive and sometimes experimental approach.

Keywords: religion, method, cognitive science of religion, content analysis, naturalism, phenomenology.

1. Introduction. Pluralistic Approach in the Study of Religion

Since the modern times, religion is understood as a cultural phenomenon which can be explained by science [37, p. 151]. However, scholars interested in this topic, first philosophers and then also psychologists, sociologists or anthropologists, developed different methods and approaches. In this paper I briefly discuss some key elements appropriate for the most popular and important research approaches within the study of religion. The main aim of this topic is described in the journal “Method & Theory in the Study of Religion” launched in 1989. From time to time new books focused on the questions of not only methodology, but even of definition of religion, are published. Consider for instance: „What is Religion?” of Jeppe Sinding Jensen [21], “Religion, Öffentlichkeit, Moderne: Transdisziplinäre Perspektiven” of Judith Könemann and Saskia Wendel (eds.) [23] or „The Study of Religion: An Introduction to Key Ideas and Methods” of George D. Chrystides and Ron Geaves [6]. There are much more books in recent years which present this topic [26], [5], [36], [7], [42].

Religion is the research subject which can be found on the intersection of two research approaches: quantitative and qualitative [35, p. 6]. When we want to choose the most optimal research approach, we should take into account reliability, validity and generalizability of our research data [35, p. 7]. The most effective approach is not the only question in case of studying the religion, but first of all it is the philosophical, metaphysical and epistemological questions that cover reality of religious contents. This is why we observe dichotomy between two basic research

approaches: *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften*. This latter approach is rather widely accepted nowadays. However it seems that religion should be analyzed by mixed approach which includes not only explanation (domain of *Naturwissenschaften*) but also some kind of understanding (approach suitable for *Geisteswissenschaften*). Now religion is analyzed rather as a phenomenon associated with the human physiology and nature more than as a cultural phenomenon [1, p. 7]. Development of the study of consciousness and mind is applied to the study of religion, especially by Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). In the light of CSR, this correlation between human consciousness and physiology in the context of religious beliefs and experiences seems very significant. Saint Theresa's visions in some sense have shaped the nature of Spanish Catholicism [1, p. 10]. This example shows how important is mixed research approach which in the same manner includes historical analysis as well as the study of consciousness that includes looking for the neuronal correlates of religious beliefs and experiences.

Jensine Andresen and Robert K. C. Forman suggest using methodological pluralism within the study of religion which includes four following approaches: doctrinal analysis, social expression, subjective experience and scientific (objective) research [1, p. 11]. These four fields of analysis of religion seem especially important by the reason of cultural and social biases which in some sense are natural effect of socialization. For instance, European and American scholars are educated in historically Christian societies and they can understand the most significant and basic elements of Christianity often as practitioner participants. What's about other religious tradition, when scholar is out of particular religious culture [19, p. 47]? How can the western scholar really understand the core of religious beliefs of believers of other religious traditions? Religions were developed as a result of particular, actual needs of local inhabitants. According to one of hypothesis about origin of monotheistic religion based on so called *moralizing High Gods* these three religions were developed in the Middle East by very practical reason. In this region sources of the water are very poor and the authors of this hypothesis suggest that idea of the supernatural and powerful judge was needed to fairly control access to the water [2, p. 2]. Of course, this explanation is only one of the many hypotheses about origin of religion. Its utility consists in underlying that people of different cultures and regions may have different reasons for acquisition of this or that religion as well as the same religion.

In this context it is worth to remember about possibility of politicization of religion. Political reasons are one of them which introduce great difference among possible motivation for acquisition of religions. Maybe religion is in some sense specific phenomenon which should be analyzed by scholars in some sense associated with religion which is their research object. Another question is current secular and post-secular nature of the Western society. In this relatively new context, traditional religions are often replaced by references to spiritual experiences which are in some sense independent from religious conceptual framework [9, p. 537]. This social phenomenon requires careful separation between religious (traditional, institutional) and spiritual (not institutional, often taken from other traditions) concepts and values.

Religion is common human phenomenon but its cross-culture ubiquity causes many different versions of religions and kinds of its understanding. This pluralism causes that it is important to propose universal or at least integral approach to the study of religion [9, p. 524]. We can observe current tendency to mix different approaches which traditionally were developed separately within the study of religion. In this place let me briefly consider the basic research approaches which also today are used as the most popular and standard research approach to explain or/and understand religious beliefs and practices.

2. Content Analysis

More naturalistic approach is based on experiments and surveys. More humanistic one prefers textual analysis. One of them is content analysis. Within the content analysis we should remember about cognitive biases and epistemological questions. First of all it is worth to keep in mind the question of subjectivity [24, p. 112]. It appears that this “reader-dependence” of texts meanings may be especially troublesome in the case of religious texts. We know how different may be interpretations of the same “sacred” texts. “Reader-dependant” bias affects the way of interpretation and understanding of religion. Consider the following example in *the Gospel according to Matthew*. Jesus said: “Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword” (10:34) [41]. On the one hand, today probably none of the Christian leaders will interpret this phrase literally, as a call to battle. On the other hand, this phrase was one of the most cited biblical phrases to justify religious conflicts in the modern Europe. Scholar within the study of religion should discover the real and primary meaning of this text. He should explain why literal meaning of this text is other than its official interpretation. He should present at least three kinds of meanings: intention of its author, meaning for reader/believer and practical consequences for believers, religion, and society. In this case we can observe other problematic question: selection of appropriate contents. What parts of analyzed „sacred” texts can we evaluate as a basic and representative for particular religion? For instance, texts which are focused on violence or those focused on altruism? How can we know when analyzed text has metaphorical meaning, when was used to achieve some particular aims and when is representative and should be understood literally? This postulate is very simple and evident but at the same time is almost impossible to real introduction. We know how important is the impact of other factors as education, socialization, actual political or economical context, actually dominant basic ideas and concepts, etc. Consider following case. Islam is religion of peace. Despite this doctrinal core, some scholars identify Islam with violence and aggression. This approach is appropriate for some “new atheists” in US, i. a. for Sam Harris [15, p. 12].

This is why scholars of religion should include geographical and historical factors which intensively shape and determine religious contents. These out of essential factors affect both practice of believers and concepts introduced by the authors of religious texts as well as kinds of interpretations of some religious beliefs and behaviors.

How can we discover the „real” core of religion when we see a lot of differences cross culture and history? In the Polish case, Polish Catholicism is other than Italian, Mexican or Filipino. The Polish Catholicism was other in 17th century (in the period of religious unification of the state against external enemies) than in the period of the Polish People’s Republic (1952-1989, PRL in Polish). After 1989 this Catholicism lives another way. On the one side, we have official doctrines, on the other side, we should refer to particular periods and regions and explain these great differences among one religion. Even if scholar is aware of this time and place dependence, it is difficult to understand and more to explain „real” and „model” religious behaviors and beliefs. Many factors in the same place or period modify the nature of religious experiences and beliefs (age, profession, sex, health, social status, education, etc.).

We can confront official documents with everyday life practice of believers but differences between them cannot be settled in favor of the former or the latter side in terms of orthodoxy and apostasy. In the study of religion, similar as in all others disciplines which are based on analysis of the past patterns and phenomenon, scholars meet the problem of “correct” and “true” reconstruction of religion [19, p. 47]. In this context we come back to the most basic issue of the definition of religion and its understanding in the light of its historical, social and cultural dynamics. Is religion historically closed or open? When someone chooses the first solution he should show which period is this correct and fundamental one. The second solution removes this difficulty however it introduces the problem of relativism, conventionalism and high cultural diversity. Consequently,

every believer theoretically could have private religious point of view and this individual approach should be treated as the same valid as all others interpretations. In the case of The Roman Catholic Church we can indicate on dispute which began after II Vatican Council. Until today we see two basic parties: one of them interpret this reform as a correct solution, other party underlines the break of long ecclesial tradition. We can see also other two approaches. On the one side, the Council is interpreted as an introduction of modernism and Enlightenment into the Church. On the other side, the same Council is understood as a continuation of traditional teaching [29, pp. 6-10]. This one sample shows how difficult is trial to objectively evaluate contents in the religious matters.

One of the forms of textual analysis, associated with the content analysis, is discourse analysis. This approach may be used as some kind of supplement for content analysis within the study of religion. Consider the following example made by Titus Hjelm: What's the matter when newspaper writes about „Muslim terrorists” and why nobody writes about „Christians terrorists” [17, p. 134]? From time to time we can see practical consequences of some news (the case of *Charlie Hebdo* or Danish Cartoonist). This approach implies the concept of cultural policy and public theology. Both of them are particular cultural tools which in implicit or explicit manner shape social consciousness and imagination in reference to religious issues. Recent example of implicit cultural policy was “strategic canonization” developed by John Paul II who wanted to introduce positively associated religious contents into global secular world. Among the most important figures of this policy were “international celebrity saints”: Padre Pio and Mother Theresa [4, pp. 441, 451]. Current new strategy presented by pope Francis is also a kind of cultural policy, the same as the opposite approach appropriate for the Church cultural policy before The Second Vatican Council [39].

Discourse analysis explains the causes and the nature of social construction processes. In this field it strictly connects with content analysis: what does sacred text mean? What is its social, political or psychological aim? Why does one believer understand it in one way and other believer in another way? What are the practical consequences of these texts and of different kinds of their interpretations and understanding? Finally, how is shaped the social „image” of religion? Discourses create identities, relationships and beliefs [17, p. 136]. This approach may explain the impact of social and political factors on the religious contents. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, current cultural trends require today (policy of pope Francis) a different strategy than conservative cultural policy developed until 1958 when the Church was understood still as a metaphysically the only true political institution more than cultural and social element of current complex world.

3. Field Research

This approach seems necessary for the relevant study of religion. When someone wants to fully understand the real core of religion, he should go beyond texts and official statements of religious authorities and believers and go to everyday life practice of believers [16, p. 217]. This is third important level, next to official doctrine and impact of social, political or cultural factors. Religion, as well as other cultural phenomenon, was developed in particular time and place as some kind of cultural adaptation. Religion was needed for local people and could fulfill some practical functions: psychotherapeutic on the individual level, and ethical and social on the group level (for example, dynamic correlation between in-group trust and inter-group conflicts and aggression). Judaism, Christianity and Islam were developed by particular people, often they were used in political and ideological way. Probably the sacred texts could be sometimes modified to achieve some aims. This is why these sacred texts can say more about their authors and the life of their believers than about religion itself.

Religion is still shaped by people and is a flexible phenomenon. When scholar wants to understand and explain religion, he should analysis not only texts, but first of all real practice of

believers. Why do today some people take Christianity as their religion? Jesus was a poor man who lived about 2000 years ago in the region occupied by the Roman Empire. Why today for example the rich American who lives in New York can take this religion? Exclude all questions associated with alleged psychoterapeutical potential of the image of poor Jesus, as consolation for unemployed, homeless or ill individuals. Consider that this American is free from these problems. Why does he take this religion instead of a lot of others? To explain this phenomenon and many other issues, field research seems accurate research approach. It is used to explain dynamic and living, real nature of religion which should be understood as a phenomenon which is not statistic and historically closed.

Religion is culturally evolving phenomenon which expresses aims, features and desires of currently living people. Some elements appropriate for previous life style may be inaccurate in the current social and cultural framework. This inadequacy especially refers to moral and ethical issues as well as to political matters. Consider the following case of the Roman Catholic Church before the Second Vatican Council. The Council has introduced new solutions which earlier were condemned, as the concept of religious freedom, the unity of religions or ecumenism. In the official political area the Church showed that these new strategies are consistent and justified by the sacred texts. However, opposite previous solutions were also justified in the same way (texts, tradition and the Magisterium of the Church). Texts analysis and phenomenology are not allowed to explain this context of the core of religion because sacred texts still are the same despite radical doctrinal or legal changes. Field research is used to explain what the real causes of changes of religious attitude toward the world are.

CSR provides another argument for field research. “Theological (in)correctness” hypothesis shows that many believers often modify official dogmas or others doctrinal elements [31]. These strategies are often in moral and ethical issues, however not only. Field research can show what does religious experience mean and how believer understands religion. This approach could explain why the same sacred text is a motivation to altruism for one believer and in the same time for suicide terrorism for another one.

Graham Harvey sees three basic elements of the research field applied to the study of religion. The first field is the believer’s activity. The second one are beliefs about their activity. The last one focuses on beliefs and understanding of the researchers which take religious activities [16, p. 218].

3. Grounded Theory, Hermeneutics, History and Phenomenology

There are in this outlined methodological landscape other important and popular approaches to the study of religion. Grounded theory (“constant comparative method”) seeks to build appropriate theory on the base of analyzing cases. Steven Engler enumerates three basic reasons for its application: 1. the lack of knowledge about some kind of phenomenon; 2. uselessness of existing theories and 3. an intent to use another theory instead of these ones previously applied [8, pp. 256-257]. This meta-methodological paradigm precedes in some sense a development of every new method. It seems that especially in the case of CSR and naturalistic approach last two reasons were crucial for adaptation of cognitive and neuronal approach to explaining “old” religious phenomenon.

Hermeneutics of religious texts should explain whose interest was promoted in the texts in the past and whose interest may be promoted today [14, p. 278]. Not only writers create texts compatible with their particular interests. Interpreters in the next generations may change literal meanings of texts by introduction of new interpretations, especially symbolical and metaphorical explanations. Hermeneutics could be supplemented by field research to better understand and to explain current beliefs and motivations of believers. This approach refers i. a. to key words used in official religious texts. Consider again the following example in the Roman Catholic tradition. The

Council introduced new concepts as common human dignity, ecumenism and religious unity which before the Council were rejected and interpreted in specific way [39].

Hermeneutical method requires in some sense an application of a historical approach, especially to reconstruct genealogy and reasons of religious texts and rituals. This stage is common for history and hermeneutics. Historical perspective can explain whose interests and what motivations were realized by particular texts or rituals in particular time and place [28, p. 292]. For example, in the Roman Catholic Church you can analyze why some part of Catholics accepts today in vitro method despite traditional catholic teaching about the origin of life. Historical paradigm can explain this and many others dichotomies between official dogmas and ecclesial decrees, and believers personal attitude. In this context it is worth to remember John Locke's comment that Ten Commandments were given only for Israelites, not for all the mankind. His suggestion presents practical political and social meaning of religion.

Phenomenology gives a common background for described approaches and can explain incompatibilism appropriate for some religious people. Phenomenology focuses on three following elements: allegiance, identity and preference [33, p. 334]. These levels can imply opposite contents which are adapted by believer. Naturalistic approach which usually rejects phenomenology cannot explain some topics without phenomenology.

4. Comparison

Comparison, developed since 19th century by the British researches [34, p. 23], is now the basic approach within CSR. Comparative approach includes i. a. discourse and content analysis, hermeneutics or phenomenology [34, p. 34]. When CSR scholar wants to show common cognitive natural base for religious beliefs, he usually does compare various religious beliefs and religious traditions. He must decide whether a particular feature is a domain of nature or a domain of culture. On the one hand, comparative approach began the process of naturalistic analysis of religion. On the other hand, until today this approach is used to show that one religion is the better one than other, however that is not the aim of comparison method. One of the main reasons to develop comparative approach was to show similarities and connections between Christianity and other traditions. This is why tendency to looking for the best religion by their comparison is side-effect of this method [34, p. 33]. Some scholars, as e.g. Émile Durkheim see an analogy between comparison method and "indirect experiment": comparison is understood sometimes as a kind of experiment in other sciences [34, p. 25].

5. Cognitive Science of Religion, Evolutionary Approach and Experiments

CSR explains origin and nature of religious beliefs by explanation of natural human mind and neural processes [25, p. 50], [38]. CSR may be interpreted as a complex of methods which general aim is to explain all religious phenomenon and beliefs by comparing them or reducing them to natural, cognitive correlates. Boyer's "parasitic" nature of religious beliefs expresses this cognitive approach: religion always uses natural human mechanisms [25, p. 51].

Luis Oviedo indicates on internal limitations of cognitive methodology. First of all, CSR especially within its standard model does not include other important factors of believers, as his education, culture, etc. [25]. However, this approach is going modified i. a. by Armin van Geertz who underlines that our cognition is encultured and embedded what is especially important in the field of religion [10], [11], [12], [13].

CSR is associated with the evolutionary approach, especially with evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary perspective is today some kind of common scientific and research framework [30, p. 2]. This approach is especially useful in the field of the study of human natural morality [40].

Jesper Sørensen reminds that CSR took its thematic framework from the comparative study of religion that is the question about common popularity usually the same religious beliefs and

phenomena [32, p. 466]. CSR requires some kind of reductionism because the aim of CSR is to explain religious beliefs and phenomena by mechanisms and processes appropriate for “normal” beliefs and phenomena. Religion is understood as a particular kind of beliefs and phenomena in general [32, p. 468]. CSR proposes some methodological tools which are commonly used to explain religious phenomena. Let me enumerate some of them: MCI hypothesis; intuitive ontology, physics, biology and psychology; HADD (agency detection hypothesis); “theological (in)correctness” hypothesis; ToM. All of them are the research tools which can explain particular areas appropriate for the origin and transmission of religious beliefs. However, religion seems too complex phenomenon which should not be explained in the terms of the simplest basic functions of human mind and body.

Look at the following particular case. One of the problematic questions may be the concept of theological (in)correctness, the basic one within CSR. How can we talk about flexible ideas and beliefs when religious individual modifies subjectively official religious beliefs? How to measure the real impact of formal religious beliefs and ideas in the context of this natural cognitive “deformation”? This unilateral framework of the first standard model of CSR is still extended about others research perspectives. This is the main assumption of the dual inheritance theory (gene-culture coevolution).

In Brno (Czech Republic) scholars in the study of religion measure experimentally within CSR some figures associated with origin, development and transmission of religious beliefs. There is the only experimental research centre on religion in the world: LEVYNA - Laboratory for Experimental Research of Religion at the Masaryk University. Some of the research project titles present very experimental nature of these scholars: „Feeling the Keeling” (Eva Kundtová Klocová), „Where are my legs?” (Silvie Kotherová), „Disgust and fear interactions in rituals” (Vladimír Bahna), „Ritualized action and prosociality” (Radek Kundt) [18]. On the one side, it seems natural that experimental methods were introduced also into the study of religion. On the other side, this approach evidently needs to be completed by others perspectives, i. a. these ones mentioned above. Experimental method in the study of religion has at least one advantage over others approaches: experiment is used to test hypothesis and to show their falsifiability [3, p. 169].

Other interesting application of this method within the study of beliefs, especially religious beliefs of children is used to create a substitute of the “primitive” human being in the pre-culture period. This step seems especially useful within the CSR which is focused on discovering and analysis of first, natural human cognitive tendencies and biases in the terms of theistic and atheistic ideas and beliefs. However, Justin Barrett underlines that children intellectual perspective and kinds of meaning differ on adult’s perspective [3, p. 173]. Explanation of alleged human natural tendency in the terms of his theistic or atheistic attitudes implies many other contexts and, first of all, is impossible because of no access to consciousness of these primitive humans.

6. Conclusion

The study of religion often refers to two general research approaches: positivism and reductionism [20, p. 42]. Despite this naturalistic tendency it appears that religious matters require not only explanation of religious objects, but also interpretation and understanding of religious subjects [20, pp. 46-47]. This subjective approach is underlined especially by feminist methodology in the study of religion which shows that scholars always engage their private point of view [22, p. 63].

Other important question is the complex nature of religion itself [27, p. 70]. Its particular components are different and require specific research methods. Political or economical strategies of the great religious institutions are something different than individual meditation of one believer. Both of them are equally important parts of the same phenomenon: religion.

Within the study of religion we have a great risk of at least three pitfalls. One of them is idealism when scholar interprets some idea or belief as a leading motif which determines development of religion. Other cognitive and methodological bias is objectification that is an

assumption that analyzed reality is highly ordered and structured. The last one is an ideology when scholar's point of view is determined by some particular ideas, ideology, etc. [27, p. 71]. This last case is associated with particularly preferred philosophical perspective. Scholars who are naturalists may have more tendencies to naturalistic and atheistic interpretation of religion than scholars – dualists. This is why CSR is sometimes understood as a naturalistic research program which determines all future research results.

Religion is the very complex social, cultural, psychological and political phenomenon which should be analyzed by reference to pluralistic mixed research approach.

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The Necessity of the Dialogue Between Judaism and Christianity



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He has over 200 other publications as well. In addition to Ben-Gurion University, Prof. Lasker has taught at University of Toronto, Yale University, Princeton University, Ohio State University, University of Texas, University of Washington, and other institutions.

Tudor Petcu: The relation between Judaism and Christianity represents a subject that obligates us to think more about history which hasn't facilitated too well the possibility of a strong dialogue. If I say that Christians have a historical responsibility to reexamine their cultural and ethical behavior regarding the Jews, I think I say everything, but I'm not quite sure about one fact. I don't know how much Christians have managed to eliminate their prejudices and to understand that you can't be a real Christian if you are at the same time anti-Semitic. So, what do you think about that? In your opinion, how does the present dialogue between Judaism and Christianity look like?

Daniel J. Lasker: For most of its history, Christian thinkers taught that the delegitimization of Judaism was necessary for the justification of Christianity. This delegitimization did not necessarily include active persecution of Jews, but it often led to discriminatory legislation; false accusations of ritual murder, host desecration, and well-poisoning; massacres of Jewish populations; forced conversions; expropriation of property and expulsions. Although many Christian theologians upheld Augustine's view that Jews were to be allowed to remain in Christian countries (albeit in a subordinate status), Christian rulers and their populations often found Jews convenient scapegoats and objects of persecution. An almost natural consequence of this delegitimization of Judaism was modern secular anti-Semitism which culminated in the Holocaust.

Even though the Nazis were not traditional Christians, much of their ideology drew upon Christian anti-Jewish sources, including Luther's virulent anti-Judaism. In the light of the Holocaust, many Christians felt true remorse that their teachings of supersession and triumphalism led to such horrible consequences. Therefore, since World War II, many Christians, most notably the Catholic Church whose general silence during the Holocaust is still a very sore point among Jews, sought a way of reinterpreting Christianity such that there is still a place for Jews and Judaism in the divine economy after what they believed was the Incarnation and subsequent fulfillment of the law by the crucifixion.

As a result of these changes in Christian teaching, expressed most prominently in Vatican II's *Nostrae Aetate*, Christians have looked for ways to reinterpret traditional Christian teachings to eliminate anti-Semitism. The "Jews" of the Gospels, especially John, are understood to be some Judeans and not all Jews. The onus for the execution of Jesus has generally passed over to the Romans and away from Jews, despite the presumed quotation: His blood be upon us and our children. In short, many Christians today are doing their best to reinterpret Christianity so as to preserve their belief in Jesus' salvation without necessarily denigrating Judaism and present-day Jews. To the extent that Christians have succeeded in reworking their view of Jews and Judaism, they have made dialogue between Jews and Christians possible and have demonstrated that believing in Christianity did not force the believer to be anti-Semitic. Not all Christians share the goal of legitimizing Judaism, even in those churches, such as the Catholic Church, where reinterpretation of the place of Judaism in the divine plan is official policy.

Jews and Christians also have succeeded in maintaining cordial relations concerning issues of joint interest even in the absence of theological changes. In the US, Orthodox Jews and Catholics are interested in state support of parochial schools; these groups and some Evangelicals cooperate in the fight against abortion and the acceptance of same sex relations and marriage. Many Jews are willing to cooperate with Evangelicals in support of the State of Israel. Liberal Jews and Christians often share political and social goals. This has occurred in the absence of any new theological understandings.

Tudor Petcu: What holds Jews and Christians together is certainly the Old Testament, and especially, the Patriarch Abraham. But, I think Christians have forgotten the importance of the Old Testament, believing that the New Testament is the only way by which they can gain redemption. From this point of view I would be very pleased if you could explain the importance of the Old Testament so that our Christian readers can better understand their Jewish heritage.

Daniel J. Lasker: Jews do not consider the Hebrew Bible to be an "Old Testament." If there is a sequel to the Hebrew Bible, it is the "Oral Torah," codified in the Talmud and subsequent law codes which are the basis of Jewish observance to this day. Christians, however, cannot ignore Hebrew Scriptures since the Manichean attempt of rejecting the Jewish revelation in favor of exclusive reliance upon the Greek scriptures has always been rejected by orthodox Christianity. From the Jewish point of view, however, the reading of the Hebrew Bible as an Old Testament which is fulfilled only in the New Testament is part of the delegitimization of Judaism I mentioned above. It would be most useful for Christians to read the Hebrew Bible on its own terms and appreciate how important it is for understanding both Judaism and Christianity. The concept of Messiah, although that term is not used in the Hebrew Bible in the context of future salvation, cannot be understood without its origins in the Hebrew Bible. When Christians do read the Hebrew Bible, it is imperative for Jewish-Christian understanding that Christians not try to appropriate the concept of "Israel" for themselves but rather understand how central the biblical narrative is for Jewish self-understanding.

Tudor Petcu: In the last, let's say, 40 years, some Christian representatives and thinkers have made a lot of efforts to heal the memory of the evil. And when I'm saying that, I make reference, of course, to the Holocaust, for which there is Christian culpability. When I'm talking about these efforts, I cannot forget about one of the most important Christian documents, which was approved during the Vatican II Council, called *Nostra Aetate*. How do you see this document? Can we say that it was an important step for a new era of the dialogue between Judaism and Christianity?

Daniel J. Lasker: Obviously, *Nostra Aetate* has had a central role to play in Jewish-Christian rapprochement since Vatican II. It should not be forgotten that this was a major step by the Catholic Church in an attempt to heal the wounds of the past. But it also should not be forgotten that for

many Jews, this statement did not go nearly far enough to wipe out 2000 years of persecution and discrimination. The final text eliminated some of the unequivocal pro-Jewish language of the earlier drafts and also seemed to go out of its way to placate other groups which are not sympathetic to Jews and Judaism. Furthermore, many Jews believed that the charge of deicide was not accurate to begin with – why should the Catholic Church be congratulated for amending a position which was illegitimate at its inception? Some Jews still expect explicit apologies from Christians, especially from Catholics and the Pope, for Jewish suffering caused by Christians over the centuries and for what is perceived as Pope Pius XII's collaboration with the Nazis (and they demand the opening of Vatican archives). This is not easy for Catholics who see their predecessors as role-models (and often saints) despite some of their negative attitudes towards Jews. However one sees *Nostra Aetate*, it was obviously a milestone and many Jews hope that the Catholic Church will build upon this and eventually understand the pain and damage inflicted on the Jewish people in the name of Christianity.

Tudor Petcu: One of the most important Christian leaders, whose main purpose was the reconciliation with Judaism, was Pope John Paul II. During my researches on the relations between Jews and Christians, I've studied a lot his personality under this aspect. And now I remember very well two steps that he took for a new dialogue with Judaism: his meeting with Rabbi Elio Toaff, which, I think, meant a lot, and his document on the Shoah. Have these efforts made by Pope John Paul II been helpful for a better understanding between Jews and Christians?

Daniel J. Lasker: Pope John Paul II was perceived by many Jews as someone who truly wished to right the wrongs of the past; who was willing to recognize the State of Israel; as someone who was anti-Nazi and anti-Communist (the two great anti-Semitic movements); and as a Pole who empathized with the suffering of Jews especially on Polish soil. But I think that whoever would have been Pope, the historical processes set in motion by Pope John XXIII would have continued. Even Pope Benedict, a German who had been a member of Hitler Youth, was very conscious of the need to continue the dialogue with Jews that had been started by his predecessors. It should be remembered, however, that John Paul II's first and foremost consideration was the interests of the Catholic Church and not the sensitivities of the Jewish People.

Tudor Petcu: I am tempted to talk about a complementarity between Judaism and Christianity, because they have in common more than we can think. So, do you agree that this complementarity is an essential condition for a right understanding of the European identity?

Daniel J. Lasker: The concept of a Judeo-Christian tradition is very controversial. Obviously Judaism and Christianity have more in common with each other than either one has, e.g., with eastern religions. Although one can understand Judaism on its own terms without reference to Christianity while Christianity can be understood only in terms of Judaism, the Jewish encounter with Christianity has had a major effect on the development of Judaism in the past millennium. Thus a full understanding of Judaism requires a study of the Christian societies in which Jews lived.

In terms of European identity, it has been shaped not only by Christian doctrine but also by Christian delegitimization of Judaism. After all, it was in Europe that the Holocaust took place and it is Europe which judges the State of Israel by different standards than it judges other countries and peoples. Although European governments have tried to overcome anti-Semitism after World War II, it is still a powerful force in Europe, both among right wing nationalist parties and among the growing Muslim immigrant communities. Obviously, then, it is important for nominally Christian Europeans to understand Judaism and Jewish history in order for them to understand themselves better and to overcome the terrible events of the past.

The Importance of the Philosophy in our Days



Michael Inwood was born in London in 1944. From 1967 until 2011 he was a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Trinity College, Oxford. He is now an Emeritus Fellow of the College and lives in Oxford. He has produced various publications on Heidegger, Hegel, and ancient philosophy.

Tudor Petcu: Although, the philosophy has a lot of meanings and definitions, I wonder which would be the best definition of philosophy. So, at the beginning of our dialogue I would like to ask you how would you define philosophy?

Michael Inwood: As you say, the word ‘philosophy’ has a wide variety of meanings or uses, covering, for example, the precepts or beliefs underlying a person's approach to life (as in ‘My philosophy is ...’), calm resignation (as in ‘approaching disasters philosophically’), and the systematic examination of our fundamental concepts, such as truth, causality, and freedom. Since I have spent most of my life teaching philosophy as an academic discipline, the last of these meanings comes closest to what I engaged in. However, even that fairly restricted account of philosophy might be applied to a wide variety of enterprises. The work of two people who are customarily regarded as philosophers, say, Nietzsche and Frege, might seem to have relatively little in common. The concept of philosophy is perhaps what is sometimes called an ‘essentially contested concept’, along with such concepts as art, religion, poetry, democracy, and freedom, where there is wide divergence both in the definition of the concept and in the application of it. I might respond to your question by asking why you ask it? After all, if I were a mathematician, a chemist or a physicist, you would not begin by asking me to define chemistry, etc. A chemist can quite happily pursue his or her subject without worrying about how to define it. Perhaps the answer is that philosophy is intrinsically a reflective or meta-discipline, in a way that, say, chemistry is not. From the very beginning, philosophers such as Socrates and Plato, have never been content simply to practice philosophy, but have always felt bound to ask ‘What is philosophy?’ and ‘What is the point of doing it?’

Tudor Petcu: We are usually talking in our days about the so called “pragmatic world”. What do you exactly understand by “the pragmatic world”? Which are in your opinion the main reasons that made possible this pragmatism in the world that I’m trying to talk about?

Michael Inwood: ‘Pragmatic world’ is not a usual English expression and I am not quite sure what you mean by it. If you mean the ‘practical world,’ in the sense of the world in which we are concerned with practical results, rather than theories and principles, then there has always been a pragmatic world in that sense and even philosophers and scholars in other disciplines spend a great deal of their time in it. If I have a toothache, I consult a dentist rather than a philosopher. Socrates himself worked as a stone mason and also reflected on the nature of a craft. Many British and American philosophers have thought it fruitful and important to reflect on common practical life and language rather than to confine their attention to technical philosophical matters, even if they do not go as far as becoming stone masons. On the other hand, there has been a tendency among philosophers to think that a life of philosophical contemplation is, if not the only good life, at least the best sort of life. Socrates goes even further in saying that the unexamined life is not worth living. I cannot see much reason to accept this extravagant claim. I am reminded of Lord Macaulay’s response to Seneca, who expressed contempt for practical inventions and their inventors, saying ‘We shall next be told that the first shoemaker was a philosopher!’ Macaulay commented: ‘For our own part, if we are forced to make a choice between the first shoemaker and the author of the three books *On Anger*, we pronounce for the shoemaker. It may be worse to be angry than to be wet. But shoes have kept millions from being wet; and we doubt whether Seneca ever kept anybody from being angry.’

On the other hand, the ‘pragmatic world’ may be the specifically modern world that Max Weber had in mind when he said: ‘The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the world”. ‘Rationalization’ involves cost-benefit calculation and bureaucratic organization, while ‘disenchantment’ involves desacralization or secularization, the decay of traditional institutions and beliefs expressing the spiritual dimension. The church is replaced by the supermarket, priests by medical doctors, and so on. Socrates himself made a contribution to all this by insisting that we must have good, explicit reasons for everything we do and believe. Weber assigned an important role to ascetic Protestantism, especially Calvinism, with its stress on one’s secular vocation as service to God. More generally, the Enlightenment laid the groundwork for such a society, with its critique of religion and of tradition and its ideal of rationality, though the Enlightenment itself presumably owes something to the Protestant reaction against Catholicism. Religion played a big part in its own decline.

Tudor Petcu: Can we say that postmodernism is a reason which encourages the development of the pragmatism? Do you think that postmodernism represents a paradigm that “betrays” contemplative thinking?

Michael Inwood: I find the term ‘postmodernism’ too vague and amorphous to able to answer this question definitively. I have found one example of its use in 1914: ‘The raison-d’etre of Post-Modernism is to escape from the double-mindedness of Modernism by being thorough in its criticism – by extending it to religion as well as theology, to Catholic feeling as well as to Catholic tradition.’ In this sense, post-modernism would contribute to the disenchantment and rationalism that I mentioned above. However, in the sense in which word is now used, at least to refer to a philosophical movement, it suggests an attempt to undermine Enlightenment beliefs and values, such as objective truth, historical progress, univocity of meaning, and the certainty of universal rational explanations, and to reject ideology and theory in favour a plurality of beliefs and values. It

is perhaps reminiscent of the 18th century romantic reaction against Enlightenment. Postmodernism in this sense might well encourage a version of pragmatism in deciding what to believe and how to act: if there are no objective truths or values, why should I not do and believe what it suits my purposes to do or believe? However, I do not see why postmodernism as I have outlined it should 'betray' contemplative thinking – except if, as it sometimes does, it falls below acceptable standards of coherence and intelligibility.

Tudor Petcu: From a certain point of view, maybe we can say that the 20th century meant a tendency to eliminate metaphysics. For instance, we can remember Rudolf Carnap who has been writing about the elimination of metaphysics through the logical analysis of the language. But in spite of this fact that I have emphasized, could we find a certain method of the truth in metaphysics?

Michael Inwood: Philosophers have often felt the need to distinguish their own way of doing philosophy from various spurious versions of the discipline. For Socrates and Plato, the enemy was sophistry. For medieval philosophers it was heresy and atheism. In early modern times the target of ridicule was scholasticism, as well as atheism. And, as you say, in the 20th century it was metaphysics. The word 'metaphysics' does not, however, have a single, clear meaning. It surely belongs alongside those essentially contested concepts that I mentioned earlier. For medieval philosophers it meant something like 'ontology,' the study of being and the most general characteristics of beings. For Carnap and the logical positivists it meant claims that were unverifiable, that breached the so-called 'verification principle' and that were therefore 'meaningless.' It was intended especially to include religious claims, but also linguistically deviant claims, such as Heidegger's '*Das Nichts selbst nichtet*' ('The nothing noths/nihilates'), and similar claims made by the likes of Hegel. Heidegger himself favoured metaphysics until at least the mid-1930s, regarding it as more or less equivalent to 'ontology.' But in later writings he came to regard it as baneful, especially in the form of 'ontotheology,' and as responsible for our misguided technological view of the world. However, in the latter part of the century, Anglo-Saxon philosophers, especially Kant specialists, such as W. H. Walsh and Sir Peter Strawson, began to adopt a more generous attitude towards metaphysics. Strawson regarded himself as a 'descriptive metaphysician,' in the sense of examining our most fundamental concepts. Unlike Carnap and Ayer, he believed that the claims of such paradigmatic metaphysicians as Hegel were meaningful, even if their meaning was difficult to fathom. Several recent books have taken metaphysics seriously. I might mention *Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671*, by Robert Pasnau, who explores medieval metaphysics in all its rich diversity and subtlety. Another is Adrian Moore's book, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things*. Defining 'metaphysics' as 'the most general attempt to make sense of things,' Moore embraces a wide range of philosophers under this heading, even philosophers, such as Carnap, Frege and Quine, who would not have regarded themselves as metaphysicians. It is, in my view, a serious defect in Moore's survey that he excludes scientists such as Newton and Einstein, who surely have a better claim to have made sense of things than, say, Frege. But on the whole the catholicity of Moore's tastes, and the sympathetic insight with which he treats all his metaphysicians, are exemplary. It remains the case, however, that 'transcendent' metaphysics, which includes most religious metaphysics, is still suspect in the eyes of most Anglo-Saxon philosophers.

Tudor Petcu: Which would be from your point of view the best philosophical direction that could be assumed so that we can better understand "the pragmatic world"?

Michael Inwood: Again, it depends on what you mean by the 'pragmatic world' and also by 'understand.' If by the 'pragmatic world' you have in mind the world of political intrigue and economic competition, and if by 'understanding' you mean the shrewdness and experience to survive in this difficult and dangerous environment, then philosophy is of little use. Philosophy may

teach us wisdom, but it does not teach us streetwisdom – a word that does not appear in English dictionaries, but seems a natural extension of the adjective ‘streetwise,’ i.e. having the skills and knowledge to cope with modern urban life. Plato himself, perhaps the greatest of philosophers, came to grief in the politics of Syracuse, and Heidegger, though a great philosopher, became entangled in the toils of Nazism. If, on the other hand, by ‘understanding’ you mean reflective understanding, then I do not see why a philosopher should not understand the pragmatic world in this sense. It was, for example, a philosopher, Adam Smith, who developed a good understanding, still widely respected, of the economic system, of the motivations and machinations of businessmen, and so on. But such reflective understanding requires one to step back, distance oneself, from the practical activity that one is considering. I do not know whether Smith was himself an astute businessman. But even if he was, he was not acting as a businessman when he reflected upon their activities. This is true of the understanding of practical activity generally, I think. One cannot, while one is changing a light-bulb, engage in reflection on the phenomenology of changing a light-bulb. One has to think about that afterwards. Reflection on practical activity is a theoretical activity, not a practical activity.

It seems to me that one difficulty that philosophers might have in understanding political affairs is their tendency to focus on the truth of statements and the validity of arguments. For example, it is widely claimed by British politicians that if a person smokes and, as a result, becomes ill and dies sooner than non-smokers, then this imposes a financial burden on the health service and thereby on the public purse. This is obviously untrue, because even non-smokers get ill eventually and, if they live longer, they require a pension and other support paid for by others. However, to criticise the claim on this ground is not sufficient. Some politicians may not recognise its falsity, but others surely do. Then to understand what they say requires us to understand why they are saying it. The truth of a proposition is neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for asserting it. Politicians are, in my view, often far more intelligent than they appear to be in public. To underrate them is to underrate the difficulty of governing a complex society.

Tudor Petcu: Usually, it’s much easier to take into account the differences between the philosophical thinking and the pragmatic thinking. But if we would make an effort to find a common denominator between these two types of thinking would we have any chance to find it? If so, which would be from your perspective this common denominator?

Michael Inwood: I said earlier that reflection on practical activity is not itself a practical activity. But now I need to qualify this. The ideal of theoretical contemplation is, no doubt, not practical in the least. But a contemporary academic philosopher does not usually aspire to such an ideal. He or she is competing in an academic market-place in much the same way as Adam Smith’s businessman. Young philosophers need to publish in order to get a much-coveted and hotly contested university post. And later they need to publish in order to gain tenure, promotion, grants, and prestige among their peers. They have to find an area, preferably a fashionable area, towards which to direct their thinking and in which they have something original and plausible to say. A philosopher who simply agrees with everything said by another philosopher and has nothing to add will gain no credit for this, except perhaps from that other philosopher. He or she must say something different from other philosophers and perhaps criticise other philosophers even if they privately agree with them. Philosophers are in this respect somewhat like politicians who must often support publicly policies that they do not agree with. There are differences, of course. Politicians need to support their party; a philosopher may need to do this in order to secure promotion, but he or she may gain credit for their independence. Again, the philosopher’s audience is usually, though not invariably, more astute and critical than that of a politician, so that philosophers must pay more attention to the truth, or at least the verisimilitude, of their statements and to the validity of their arguments. The moral of this is that not only should we not believe everything that philosophers

say, but we should not believe that they believe it themselves. You might think that this applies to myself, of course. But since I have retired from the profession and withdrawn from the academic market-place, I have no reason to deceive anyone, apart from intellectual incompetence.